![](/c3/61731513765.jpg)
出版社:世界圖書出版公司 ISBN:9787519264598 商品編碼:61731513765 品牌:文軒 出版時間:2019-08-01 代碼:69 作者:馬丁·J.奧斯本(MartinJ.Osbor
"![](http://img14.360buyimg.com/cms/jfs/t1/123941/22/30115/174716/62f4a34bEe1f8313b/400f0360f7164e50.jpg) ![](//img10.360buyimg.com/imgzone/jfs/t1/106379/27/24910/44530/64473e77Fe3cb31fc/c285676f5565be9b.jpg) 作 者:(加)馬丁·J.奧斯本(Martin J.Osborne),(以)阿裡爾·魯賓斯坦(Ariel Rubinstein) 著 定 價:69 出 版 社:世界圖書出版公司 出版日期:2019年08月01日 頁 數:352 裝 幀:平裝 ISBN:9787519264598 ●Preface xi 1 Introduction 1.1 Game Theory 1.2 Games and Solutions 1.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium 1.4 Rational Behavior 1.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations 1.6 Bounded Rationality 1.7 Terminology and Notation Notes I Strategic Games 2 Nash Equilibrium 2.1 Strategic Games 2.2 Nash Equilibrium 2.3 Examples 2.4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium 2.5 Strictly Competitive Games 2.6 Bayesian Games:Strategic Games with Imperfect Information Notes 3 Mixed,Correlated,and Evolutionary Equilibrium 3.1 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 3.2 Interpretations of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Correlated Equilibrium 3.4 Evolutionary Equilibrium Notes 4 Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions 4.1 Rationalizabilitv 4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated ActionS 4.3 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions Notes 5 Knowledge and Equilibrium 5.1 A Model of Knowledge 5.2 Common Knowledge 5.3 Can People Agree to Disagree? 5.4 Knowledge and Solution Concepts 5.5 The Electronic Mail Game Notes II Extensive Games with Perfect Information 6 Extensive Games with Perfect Information 6.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information 6.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 6.3 Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game 6.4 The Interpretation of a Strategy 6.5 Two Notable Finite Horizon Games 6.6 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies Notes 7 Bargaining Games 7.1 Bargaining and Game Theory 7.2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 7.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 7.4 Variations and Extensions Notes 8 Repeated Games 8.1 The Basic Idea 8.2 Infinitely Repeated Games VS.Finitely Repeated Games 8.3 Infinitely Repeated Games:Definitions 8.4 Strategies as Machines 8.5 Trigger Strategies:Nash Folk Theorems 8.6 Punishing for a Limited Length of Time:A Perfect Fblk Theorem for the Limit of Means Criterion 8.7 Punishing the Punisher:A Perfect Fblk Theorem for the Overtaking Criterion 8.8 Rewarding Players Wh0 Punish:A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Discounting Criterion 8.9 The Structure of Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the Discounting Criterion 8.10 Finitely Repeated Games Notes 9 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Complexity and the Machine Game 9.3 The Structure of the Equilibria of a Machine Game 9.4 The Case of Lexicographic Preferences Notes 10 Implementation Theory 10.1 Introduction 10.2 The Implementation Problem 10.3 Implementation in Dominant Strategies 10.4 Nash Implementation 10.5 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Implementation Notes III Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 11 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 11.1 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 11.2 Principles for the Equivalence of Extensive Games 11.3 Framing Effects and the Equivalence of Extensive Games 11.4 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies 11.5 Nash Equilibrium Notes 12 Sequential Equilibrium 12.1 Strategies and Beliefs 12.2 Sequential Equilibrium 12.3 Games with Observable Actions:Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 12.4 Refinements of Sequential Equilibrium 12.5 Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium Notes IV Coalitional Games 13 The Core 13.1 Coalitional Games with Transferable Payoff 13.2 The Core 13.3 Nonemptiness of the Core 13.4 Markets with Transferable Payoff 13.5 Coalitional Games without Transferable Payoff 13.6 Exchange Economies Notes 14 Stable Sets,the Bargaining Set,and the Shapley Value 14.1 Two Approaches 14.2 The Stable Sets of yon Neumann and Morgenstern 14.3 The Bargaining Set,Kernel,and Nucleolus 14.4 The Shapley Value Notes 15 The Nash Solution 15.1 Bargaining Problems 15.2 The Nash Solution:Definition and Characterization 15.3 An Axiomatic Definition 15.4 The Nash Solution and the Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 15.5 An Exact Implementation of the Nash Solution Notes List of Results References Index 《博弈論教程》是國際上博弈論領域的經典研究生教材,著重於博弈論的理論基礎和基本想法的闡釋。全書分策略博弈、接近信息擴展式博弈、不接近信息擴展式博弈和聯盟博弈四部分。對於幾乎所有章節,作者對內容的選擇都保持適度而又精煉。第一作者馬丁·J·奧斯本另著有一本《博弈入門》,則以更細致的方式講解博弈論,《博弈入門》也已被引進在“世界博弈論經典”繫列中一起出版。 ![](https://img10.360buyimg.com/imgzone/jfs/t1/147514/7/5440/73116/5f34a3beE3ba58783/f5b2391383f5625c.jpg)
" |