內容簡介
This book examines Thomas Jefferson's attempt to combine respect for a fundamental constitution with the fact that no set of laws can foresee every event. His solution to this problem offers a democratic, yet strong, alternative to the more common, Hamiltonian solution. Jefferson scholars have long written of 'two Jeffersons,' one before he became president and one after he became president. The first was opposed to a strong executive, while the second embraced one out of necessity. This book challenges this account. It presents Jefferson's understanding of executive power, which, though it developed over time, pointed to an executive that was both democratic and powerful.
作者簡介:
Jeremy D. Bailey is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University. He was the co-winner of the 2004 APSA E. E. Schattschneider Award for best dissertation in American politics written in 2002 or 2003.
作者簡介:
Jeremy D. Bailey is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University. He was the co-winner of the 2004 APSA E. E. Schattschneider Award for best dissertation in American politics written in 2002 or 2003.